Propositions 1-7 seem to be inconsistent several times over, and one of these inconsistencies can be shown to follow from 1-4. Thus I shall restrict my discussion to these four propositions. In fact, it is usual for Trinitarian discussions to focus on the Father and the Son; if they can be logically reconciled, then the "love" thereby generated can be extended to include the Holy Spirit.
The apparent inconsistency involved in propositions 1-4 can be shown by deriving a contradiction from them. To do this, we have to show what steps in reasoning justify the inferences that lead to the contradiction. What we are committed to is a proof of the contradiction. We will of course require that the proof be rigorous; for if it were not, we would not be forced to accept the conclusion. Since the best, if not the only, place to find the kind of rigor demanded is in the discipline of formal logic, it is to formal logic that we must go for proof.
All the resources we need for the required proof can be found in any standard, first-order predicate logic with identity theory. The addition of identity theory to the predicate logic consists in selecting some predicate to express identity and adding rules that are suitable and sufficient to permit inferences justified by the concept of identity. For our present purposes we need only to add rules that are justified by the fact that identity is an equivalence relation, that is, a relation that has the three characteristics of reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity. Since identity is reflexive, the following principle holds:
Everything is identical with itself. In symbols, (x)(y)(x = y -y = x).
The content of the principle of symmetry can be captured in a rule of inference which allows one to reverse the singular terms flanking the identity sign:
The We are now prepared to derive a contradiction from 1-4 using the rules of natural deduction, symmetry, and transitivity. 
The Father is God.
3. The Son is God.
4'. Therefore the Father is the Son.
There is a formal proof of the validity of each of these arguments in first-order logic. Sabellius's argument can be proved with the rules already provided. This notwithstanding, to be faced with a choice between being a heretic and asserting a contradictory proposition is not to find oneself in the best possible world; it is better to be orthodox and rational, and I want to show that these qualities are compatible, at least in the present case.
III
We have three problems to solve. The first is the inconsistency of 1-4, the second is the heretical argument of Arius, and the third is the heretical argument of Sabellius. I shall take these problems in order.
3De divina omnipotentia, 4. 4 De carne Christi, 5.
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There is a clue to the solution of the first problem in other types of sentences that seem to be contradictory. Despite appearances, sentences such as "Dillinger is good" and "Dillinger is not good" need not be taken as incompatible; each can be used to express a proposition that is consistent with the other. The first sentence might be used to express the proposition that Dillinger is a good killer, the second to express the proposition that Dillinger is not a good person. In such cases, the speaker depends upon the context of the speech situation to make clear to the hearer what has to be added to his uttered sentence in order to make what he says complete. In other words, the predicate "is good" is incomplete. A thing is good in one respect or another; nothing, not even God, is good absolutely. God is good as a father but not good as a liar; he is good as a king but not good as a tyrant.
The identity predicates "is," "is the same as," and "is identical with" are incomplete in the same way. Nothing is identical with something absolutely, but only in a certain respect. Nothing is merely self-identical; there is no bare self-identity. Everything is the same such-and-such or so-and-so as something, and if it is not a such-and-such or so-and-so, it fails to be the same such-and-such or so-and-so. I am the same man as myself, but I am not the same house as myself. What Aristotle and some of his followers call numerical identity is a fiction. In short, identity is not absolute but relative.5
Since 4 and 4' do not specify the respect in which the Father and the Son are supposed to be the same and not the same, they are incomplete and thus do not necessarily contradict each other. To determine whether they do contradict each other, they must be completed to include the respect of sameness. The answer to this difficulty is to reject the proffered construal of the form of 8 and 8'; it represents identity as being absolute and ignores the all-important claim that identity is relative. Since we are claiming that identity is relative, an expression of the form 'a = 03 is incomplete; it must be supplemented with a specification of the respect in which a is identical with 3; that is, if something of the form a = 3" is true, then a is the same something as 3. Accordingly we shall use to symbolize that a is the same 0 as 0. In particular, we shall use G to symbolize "is the same God as" and P to symbolize "is the same person as." Let us then symbolize 8 as George IV wanted to know whether Scott was Sir Walter. Scott is Sir Walter. Therefore George IV wanted to know whether Sir Walter was Sir Walter.
And Leibniz, of all people, did not accept, at least during his mature period, the law that bears his name.7 He believed that substitutivity of identicals had to be abandoned to avoid such invalid inferences as the following:
Socrates qua musical is talented. Socrates qua snub-nosed is Socrates qua musical. Therefore Socrates qua snub-nosed is talented.
More recently Leonard Linsky has recommended ejection of the Law of Substitutivity on quite general grounds.8 He shows that it permits such invalid inferences as contained in the following argument:
Hesperus is the evening star. Hesperus is Phosphorus. Therefore Phosphorus is the evening star.
While the premises are true, the conclusion is false. Phosphorus is not the evening star but the morning star.
IV
In closing I want to make two general points about philosophical theology.
1. The etymological roots of "theology," OEof Xbyo , are susceptible of many interpretations, some more and some less instructive. One of these interpretations is that theology is just talk about God. This is the broadest interpretation and also the one on the lowest level because it is undiscriminating; it excludes neither gossip nor slander about God nor, for that matter, blasphemy. In a way, this interpretation is accurate; it describes much of what passes for theology today. In another sense, it fails as a description. For it does not describe how one should talk about the subject matter of theology, God and things in relation to God. A definition of theology, then, should set its sights higher; it should be normative. Thus I propose that the etymology of "theology" be interpreted as the logic of talk about God. It was not until the end of the Middle Ages that this notion of theology began to decline. Moreover, this decline can also be correlated with certain medieval theologians who introduced a new logic, one that could not render orthodoxy consistent. Theology has still not recovered from this theological stand and its aftermath. 2. Historians of dogma often explain dogmatic statements as more mature and reflective statements of the vague and inchoate beliefs of earlier ages, and this maturity and reflectiveness is credited to the Holy Spirit. Although this is often merely a handy device for trying to justify historical aberrations, the principle is a sound one. I have tried to show how reflection on the logie of the Trinity leads to fuller and more precise statements of doctrine. I have tried to provide a rational reconstruction of how one might begin with a vague and inchoate statement of doctrine and ascend to more sophisticated and more coherent beliefs. I have not made many substantial historical claims about the development of Trinitarian dogma; I have talked from a different perspective, from the logical point of view.
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